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Abstract
In many instances, ”independently minded” top ranking executives can impose
strong discipline on their CEO, even though they are formally under his authority.
This paper argues that the use of such a disciplining mechanism is a key feature of
good corporate governance.
First, we provide robust empirical evidence consistent with the fact that firms
with good internal governance are more efficiently run. We empirically label as
”independent from the CEO” a top executive who joined the firm before the cur-
rent CEO was appointed. In a very robust way, firms with a smaller fraction of
independent executives tend to exhibit a higher level of managerial slack and a
lower level of profitability. The positive relation between internal governance and
corporate performance is most pronounced in high uncertainty industries. These
results are unaffected when we control for traditional governance measures like
board independence or other well-studied shareholder friendly provisions.
Secondly, we propose a theory to derive normative implications from our find-
ings. In our model, top executives differ from outsiders only to the extent that they
are the ones who implement the CEO’s strategy; they do not have an informational
advantage over shareholders. Top executives may have beliefs that differ from the
CEO’s: thus, in order to get his strategy implemented, the CEO needs to pay atten-
tion to their expected reactions. In equilibrium, some disagreement has the benefit
of preventing bad projects from being implemented. The cost of disagreement is
that it reduces top executives’ incentives. Two implications of this model are (1)
that one of the roles of the board of director should be to design the degree of
consensus within the firm and (2) that executive independence matters more when
CEOs hold more private information.
1 Introduction
Academics and practitioners have known for long that in the absence of tight mon-
itoring, CEOs of large publicly held firms may take actions that are detrimental to
their shareholders: they commit the firm’s resources to value destroying “pet” projects,
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build unprofitable empires, prevent valuable takeovers from happening, or even, in
some rare yet highly publicized instances, engage in fraudulent window dressing or as-
set tunneling. To set up counter-powers to the CEO, the consensus among practitioners
and regulators has been to rely on a strong board of directors, independent from the
management. In many countries, informal codes of corporate governance have been
recommending the appointment of independent directors for more than a decade; and
many large firms have been eager to comply with their guidelines.1 In the US, the
recent wave of corporate scandals has triggered a stronger regulatory response, mak-
ing the hiring of independent directors mandatory for firms listed on the major stock
exchanges.2
Unfortunately, the findings of the academic literature regarding the efficiency of
independent boards are mixed. To be fair, independent boards of directors seem to pay
more attention to corporate performance when it comes to CEO turnover (Weisbach
(1988), Dahya, Mc Connel and Travlos (2002)). Also, there is some limited evidence
that the stock market hails the appointment of independent directors with small ab-
normal returns (Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990)). The main problem is, however, that
there is no evidence that independent boards improve profitability or even the value of
corporate assets.3
As a result, corporate governance scholars have recently shifted their attention away
from board composition towards other dimensions of corporate governance apparent in
executive compensation, corporate charters, bylaws or in state takeover laws. The main
finding of this literature is that investor-friendly corporate governance provisions boost
the price of firms’ assets by making them more vulnerable to takeovers (Gompers, Ishii
and Metrick (2003), Cremers, Nair and John (2005)).4 In fact, corporate governance
provisions in charters, bylaws and corporate law seem to matter only to the extent
that they allow shareholders to cash in takeover premia (Bebchuk and Cohen (2004)).
Apart from increasing vulnerability to takeovers, they seem to have no effect on actual
1For instance, the Cadbury Report issued in the UK in 1992 recommends that “the majority of non-
executives on a board should be independent of the company” . The 1998 “ Vie´not II” Report in France
proposes that “independent directors should account for at least one-third of the Board of Directors”. Com-
pliance with these guidelines was not mandatory, but widespread. For instance, by 1996, more than 50%
of the UK firms surveyed by Dahya, Mc Connel and Travlos (2002) claimed to comply with the Cadbury
Report recommendations.
2The NYSE and the NASDAQ require since 2003 a majority of independent directors on the board of
companies listed on their exchanges.
3In fact, the correlation might even be negative. A likely reason for this is that poorly performing firms
tend to appoint more outside director (Kaplan and Minton 1994). Filtering this endogenity out yields no
apparent correlation between profitability and board independence. (Baghat and Black (2003), Hermalin and
Weisbach (2003)
4Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) show that investor friendly firms have largely outperformed the
market in the 1990s, and that the price of these firms’ assets is larger. Bebchuk and Cohen (2004) show
that the corporate governance provision that matters most is the presence of a staggered (classified) board.
When the firm has such a board, it may take several years for a potential acquirer to gain control of the
board; therefore classified boards deter takeovers. Cremers, Nair and John (2005) have indeed evidence that
abnormal returns to investor-friendly corporate governance provisions are concentrated on firms vulnerable
to takeovers.
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corporate performance.5 6
This paper suggests another way to measure corporate governance at the firm level.
We start with the following hypothesis: in well governed firms, top executives are able
to challenge and discipline CEO decision making, even though they are formally under
his authority. As it turns out, an index of good ”internal” governance based on this
hypothesis is strongly (and positively) correlated with corporate performance in US
data.
Our interpretation of this fact is the following: Subordinates may disagree with
their CEO and as a result may cut down effort. Such a need to obtain the top ex-
ecutives’ agreement acts as a disciplining device on the CEO and prevents him from
undertaking controversial actions. Hence, disagreeing subordinates provide a very ef-
fective monitoring. The normative implication of this is that a crucial role of the board
of directors is to design the degree of subordinates’ independence from the CEO, rather
than to engaging in hyper active direct monitoring.
The first part of this paper is empirical and provides robust evidence that firms with
good internal governance are more profitable. On a panel of US listed corporations, we
define our index of internal governance as the fraction of top ranking executives who
joined the firm before the current CEO was appointed. Our underlying hypothesis is
that the CEO is always involved in the appointment process of top executives, who will
thus (1) share the same beliefs and/or (2) have an incentive to “return the favor”. There-
fore, we believe that our index captures the potential disagreement between executives
and the CEO.
First, we find this index to be robustly and strongly correlated with various prof-
itability measures (return on assets, on equity, market to book value of assets). Sec-
ondly, consistently with the corporate governance role of subordinates, we find man-
agerial slack, as proxied through cash holdings, M&A activity, executive compensa-
tion or CEO turnover, to be lower in organizations where executives joined the firm
before the CEO was appointed. Also, we find that internal corporate governance is
more strongly correlated with performance for firms evolving in uncertain environ-
ments, where the information asymmetry between the CEO and the shareholders is
likely to be the largest. Third, these findings are not affected when we control for tra-
ditional, “external” corporate governance measures (based on board independence or
the takeover-related corporate governance index built by Gompers, Ishii and Metrick
(2003)). One reason for this is that, in our sample, there is no clear correlation between
external and internal governance. A second reason is that, as mentioned above, external
governance is, per se, uncorrelated with firm performance, in our sample as well as in
5The only corporate governance provision that seems to affect corporate performance in a statistically
meaningful way seems to be takeover laws. Using changes in state level takeover laws, Bertrand and Mul-
lainathan (1999b,1999a,2003) find that decreased takeover vulnerability results in higher executive compen-
sation, lower plant productivity, slower reactivity to industry shocks and higher wages.
6One possible reason for this apparent paradox is that corporate governance matters in extreme circum-
stances only. In well governed firms, corporate crises are dealt with in a quicker and more efficient way and
obviously harmful acquisitions have more chance to be stopped; But because of the rarity of these events, the
benefits of sound governance will not appear in average performance measures. In such a view, apart during
corporate crises, it is not realistic to ask outside directors to monitor the management. Because meetings are
rare and short, the board monitoring ”technology” would mostly be suited to prevent catastrophes, and less
apt to improve day to day management.
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previous studies.
Hence, unrelated subordinates are associated with reduced CEO slack and im-
proved overall profitability, particularly so in uncertain industries. Our interpretation
is that unrelated executives are in a position to discipline the CEO. A possible reason
could be that subordinates are simply more informed about the firm. The problem with
independent directors would thus not be their independence from the CEO, which is
a good thing in itself, but their ignorance of corporate matters. After all, information
asymmetry between corporate insiders and outsiders is the leading paradigm prevailing
in the corporate finance literature since at least Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Myers
and Majluf (1984). If this was true, the solution to the corporate governance prob-
lem would simply be to provide independent directors with more information. Many
practical recommendations have been going in this direction (since at least Lipton and
Lorsch (1992)).
Yet there are reasons to believe that feeding outside directors with more informa-
tion may not work. First, since director will never be a full-time job, the information
asymmetry will always remain simply because information processing takes time even
for talented individuals. Secondly, although there is little variation between firms in the
amount of information received by directors, the existing evidence suggests that direc-
tors who meet more frequently, or directors who have more time to spend on preparing
those meetings do not significantly improve the firm’s operations.7 In our sample, the
share of former employees, who are likely to be better informed about the company’s
internal workings than purely independent directors is uncorrelated with corporate per-
formance.
To study the normative implications of our empirical findings, we therefore start
from a different hypothesis: It is the very fact that top executives receive orders from
the CEO rather than a direct informational advantage of insiders over outsiders, that
creates the possibility of efficient internal governance. Subordinates are by definition
in charge of implementing strategies decided by the CEO. When top executives do not
believe in the CEO’s strategy choice, they will put in less effort. When executives
are “independently minded” about what strategy is optimal, the CEO faces a tension
between (1) choosing a project the executives like to obtain their full cooperation, and
(2) ordering what he thinks is the right decision to make, at the potential cost of lower
executive enthusiasm. The more independent executives’ opinions are from the CEO’s,
the more they act as counter-powers by ”evening out” extreme CEO prior beliefs, but
the less incentives they have on average (much as in Van Den Steen (2004)).
In the context of this trade-off, what are the industries in which firms should rely
more on “bottom-up governance” ? Intuitively, when we look at industries where the
CEO has a strong informational advantage, or where his input is more crucial and dif-
ficult to assess, it should be optimal to hand him/her more power, not less. Our theory
7For example, Vafeas (1999) finds a negative cross sectional correlation between corporate performance
and the frequency of board meetings. Abnormally frequent board meetings occur in response to a drop in
performance and are in general followed a modest rebound in profitability, but this is more consistent with
mean reversion than real board effectiveness.
In addition, a sizeable US literature on multi-directors (who hold several seats) or CEO-directors (who are
CEOs of other firms) finds no evidence that these “busy” directors are less efficient at performing their tasks
(see for instance, Ferris, Jagannathan and Pritchard (2004)).
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suggests precisely the contrary. It is precisely when the informational advantage of
the CEO is high, that bottom-up governance, that is, “independently minded” execu-
tives, matters. This result arises when we analyze the communication equilibrium of
a game where the executives try to infer to what extent the CEO’s order arises from
his initial bias or from his private information. When the degree of information asym-
metry between the CEO and the other parties (executives and shareholders) is large,
disagreement improves the reactivity of the firm to new information.8
The normative implications of our analysis are twofold. First, CEO discipline is
not only enforced by the threat of hostile takeovers or board monitoring, but also from
the potential dissent of top executives with the CEO. This ”bottom-up” monitoring is
more likely to discipline management on a day-to-day basis. The good news from
our statistical analysis is that the intensity of such internal governance can be at least
partly observed and could be included in the various indexes of the quality of a firm’s
corporate governance. Second, ”external governance” still matters a great deal, but the
crucial role of the board also consists of optimizing the balance of powers within the
firm, instead of closely monitoring the management. The human resource role of the
board is not limited to the usually emphasized CEO succession problem: The board
has to properly manage the mix of various influences within the firm.
The rest of the paper has three sections: section 2 looks at the empirical evidence
of internal corporate governance. Section 3 describes our theoretical analysis. Section
4 concludes
2 Empirical Evidence
This section empirically explores the idea that good internal governance reduces CEO
slack and improves performance. Our analysis rests on our measure of internal gov-
ernance, which we compute as the fraction of top executives that joined the company
before the CEO was appointed for the job. We believe that this measure captures the
extent to which top executives have been hired by the CEO personally, albeit in a noisy
way.
We first describe our dataset, and then move to our presentation of the empirical
evidence in favor of the internal governance. We also discuss some of the limitations
of our statistical approach; compared to existing evidence on “external” corporate gov-
ernance, we believe however that our case for internal governance is not weaker.
2.1 Data and Measurement Issues
We use three datasets. The first dataset is EXECUCOMP, which provides details on
CEOs and (at least) the five best paid executives in the firm for some 2,000 firms each
8In contrast to Dessein (2002), organizational diversity, instead of homogeneity, improves communication
in our model of firm organization. The main difference between Dessein’s model and ours is in the allocation
authority. In Dessein’s model, both CEO and subordinates propose a course of action. Hence, divergence in
opinion reduces the ability of both parties to communicate. In our model, the subordinate has to implement
the order given by the CEO; he cannot propose another project. Hence, divergence in opinion is included in
the CEO’s objective, and help him to ”change his mind” more often and therefore be more reactive to the
signal.
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year between 1994 and 2002 (totalling 21,732 observation for which the CEO’s salary
is non missing). From this dataset, we extract the CEO’s compensation (including
salary, bonus and option grants), the executives’ seniorities in the firm and the CEO’s
tenure as top ranking officer. We posit that an executive is aligned with the CEO when
his seniority within the firm is smaller than the CEO’s tenure as CEO of the firm. We
then collapse the dataset at the firm-year level and use the fraction of executives hired
after the CEO was appointed as our measure of CEO/executive alignment. We call this
the fraction of aligned executives.
For each firm year, we then retrieve firm level accounting information from COM-
PUSTAT (we lose 165 observations in the merging process). We compute profitability
as return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE). We construct Market to Book as
the ratio of the firm’s assets market value to their book value, as in Gompers, Ishii and
Metrick (2003). We compute free cash as the share of cash holdings in total liabilities.
We proxy firm size by log(total assets). We proxy firm age by taking the difference
between the current year and the first year of presence in the COMPUSTAT panel. We
construct the 48 Fama-French industry dummies using the firm’s 4 digit SIC industry
code. We construct an M&A dummy using the footnotes collected in COMPUSTAT.
Variables constructions are presented in detail in appendix.
Last, we gather information on corporate governance from IRRC’s corporate gov-
ernance and directors dataset. This dataset provides us with commonly used proxies
for corporate governance. We use this dataset to compute the fraction of independent
directors, the number of directors sitting on the board and the fraction of former em-
ployees sitting on the board. These variables are available for the 1996-2001 period
only. We also collect, for the firms present in our sample, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick’s
(hereafter GIM) index of corporate governance, which compiles various corporate gov-
ernance provisions included in the CEO’s compensation package, in the corporate char-
ter and the board structure. the GIM index is available for 1990,1993,1995,1998 and
2001. In other years, we assume that it takes the value that it had in the most recent
year when it was non missing.
All in all, we end up with 12,476 observations spread over 1993-2003, for which the
share of related top executives, as well as well as accounting data from COMPUSTAT
are available. We lose almost 50% of the observations because in many cases, the
executives’ seniorities are missing, which prevents us from computing the share of
related executives. Including the GIM index of corporate further reduces the sample
size, since it was computed for the largest firms. When we require accounting data,
related executive fraction and the GIM governance index to be simultaneously non-
missing, our sample size is down to 6,764 observations. Finally, note that the sample
size may vary a little from regression to regression because all ratios (ROA, ROE,
Market to Book) have been windsorized..
2.2 Internal Governance and Corporate Performance
The crux of our empirical approach is our proxy for “internal governance”, which we
define as the fraction of top executives who joined the company after the CEO began
his tenure. The underlying assumption is that the CEO is directly or indirectly involved
in the recruitment process of top executives. Hence, executives appointed during his
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leadership are more likely to be loyal to him and share his beliefs than executives who
were picked by his/her predecessor.
Notice that such a measure is noisy: most top executives have not joined the com-
pany at this level, so we will include in our pool of “independent” top executives em-
ployees who were recruited a long time ago, but who were promoted by the current
CEO. This is likely to bias our estimates downwards. Another way to address this cri-
tique is to use the past employment history of executives from COMPUSTAT, and see
when they enter the panel - which is the date at which they enter the group of the best
paid executives surveyed by EXECUCOMP. We can then compute the share of execu-
tives whose tenure in the EXECUCOMP panel and within the firm exceeds the CEO’s
tenure as CEO. Using this alternative measure, we show that results very similar in
terms of size and significant to those reported in tables 1 and 2 (see below) obtain. The
only problem with this approach is that we have to restrict ourselves to firms for which
at least one CEO turnover has been observed during the period. This biases sample
composition towards the end of the period and firms who have experienced a turnover,
so we merely view these alternative estimates as robustness checks.
We start with investigating the correlation between internal governance and corpo-
rate performance. To do this, we run the following regression:
Yit = α+βIGit−1 + controlsit + εit (1)
where IGit−1 is our measure of internal governance, lagged one period. Note that it
is larger when internal governance is poorer. One easily addressed problem is that
IGit is likely to be larger when the CEO or the executives have served longer in the
firm. Since these variables may directly affect corporate performance, we include (1)
the CEO’s tenure as CEO and (2) the executives’ average seniority within the firm
as controls. Other controls are log(firm age), sales growth, log(assets), year and 48
Fama French industry dummies. These controls are also likely to directly affect the
degree of internal governance: fast growing firms, young firms, small firms are likely
to be the ones where new executives are frequently appointed; hence, for a given CEO
tenure, this automatically increase our index of weak internal governance. For skeptical
readers however, we include estimates with and without these controls. Since we have
several observations per firm, it is very likely that the εit are not independent within
each firm i. Hence, we allow the residuals to be correlated for observations of a given
firm. Finally, the corporate performance measures that we look at are return on equity
and return on assets.
Regression results are gathered in table 1. Column 1 to 3 use ROA as dependent
variable in equation (1); columns 4 to 6 use ROE as left hand side variable. One
standard deviation increase in our “internal governance weakness” measure results in
a decrease of about 1 percentage point of ROA and 1.2 percentage point of ROE. This
effect is not very large, but, as we will see, it is consistently significant and easily
beats usual “external” corporate governance measures. Table 8 in appendix repeats the
regressions of table 1, but looking at the market valuation of assets: unsurprisingly, the
market valuation of assets is lower for firms with weak internal governance, once we
control for plausible determinants of internal governance.
We first check the robustness of this correlation by looking at estimates of (1) for
various years, from 1995 to 2002, and by computing Fama McBeth estimates. Again,
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the correlation is consistently negative for both corporate performance measures across
years. In the case of the ROA, it is significant for 7 out of 8 cross sections, with a
coefficient between 4 and 6, except for 2002. In the case of the ROE, most of the
significance is concentrated in the first part of the period, and the coefficients look
slightly more volatile.
There are many stories consistent with the relation found in tables 1 and 2. Ob-
viously, strong internal governance could be a way for the shareholder to “hold the
CEO on a tight leash” and keep the firm away from undertaking crazy projects or em-
pire building. One could, however, argue the causality runs in the opposite direction.
In most firms, poor performance trigger a change in the management team; when the
situation is critical, the newly appointed CEO has enough bargaining power to progres-
sively dispose of all the members of the previous management team. Or alternatively,
all management team, not just the CEO, is considered as responsible for the firm’s
poor performance (Hayes, Oyer and Schaefer (2005) provide evidence of this). If this
happens, internal governance as we measure it weakens. This induces a negative cross
section correlation between corporate performance and internal governance.
While we have no “smoking gun” to assess the causal relationship between internal
governance and corporate performance, we can at least take preliminary steps to reduce
the likelihood of “management team turnover” story by looking at the joint dynamics
of internal governance and corporate performance. Do changes in corporate perfor-
mance happen before, or after changes in internal governance ? To see this, we run the
following two regressions:
Yit = α+βIGit−1 + γYit−1 + controlsit + εit (2)
IGit = a+bIGit−1 + cYit−1 + controlsit + εit (3)
where Yit is the firm’s corporate performance at date t. If changes in corporate perfor-
mance tend to happen before, we should not be able to reject that c > 0 and γ = 0. Such
a test can be thought of as the panel data version of causality tests a la Granger in times
series analysis.
Estimates of equations (2)-(3) are reported in table 3; the first two columns re-
port estimates with industry and year dummies as only controls, while columns 3 and
4 also control for executive and CEO seniorities, as well as firm size. Results sug-
gest that in general changes in internal governance happen before changes in corporate
performance. Of course, this does not completely rule out the possibility that overall
management turnover occurs in response to an expectation of future bad performance.
Also, other stories remain possible, like for example exogenous events causing both
bad performance and overall management turnover. Without a proper instrument, we
cannot completely address this critique. We take evidence from table 3 as merely sug-
gestive that weak internal governance reduces firm performance.
If strong internal governance acts as a disciplining mechanism on the CEO, we
would expect measures of apparent managerial slack to be smaller in the presence of
“independent” executives. We provide evidence consistent with this in table 4, where
we estimate equations defined as:
Zit = α+βIGit−1 + controlsit + εit (4)
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where Zit are various measures of managerial slack: a dummy variable equal to 1 in
case of an upcoming CEO turnover (column 1), a dummy variable equal to 1 in case
of a significant acquisition (column 2), the cash holding to assets ratio (column 3) and
log(Total CEO compensation), including option grants in column 4. As in previous
specifications, we include firm size, CEO and executive seniorities, year and industry
dummies as controls in all these regressions. As firm profitability and asset values
are also determinants of CEO turnover, the probability of making an acquisition, cash
holdings and CEO compensation, we also include these variables as controls.
As it turns out, results from table 4 are consistent with managerial slack being
higher in weak internal governance firms. The economic magnitudes of the effects are,
however, small. A one standard deviation increase in internal governance increases
the probability of CEO turnover by 1 percentage point (one thirtieth of this variable’s
standard deviation) and reduces the probability of an acquisition by 1.5 ppoint (one
thirtieth of this variable’s standard deviation).
2.3 External Versus Internal Governance
The evidence that we have gathered so far suggests a strong correlation between inter-
nal governance and accounting profitability; the dynamics of this correlation is more
consistent with internal governance causing better performance than the opposite. As it
turns out, firms with weak internal governance also tend to be those where managerial
slack is significantly larger, though the magnitude of the correlation is small.
One possible story consistent with such evidence is that we are proxying for corpo-
rate governance in the “traditional” sense: firms with weak shareholders, weak boards
and imperial CEOs are the ones where the CEO has all the power to appoint faithful
executives. Hence, a well entrenched CEOs is more likely to replace executives who do
not show enough loyalty and our measure of internal governance goes up. At the same
time, weak boards have no mean to oppose large compensation packages, frequent ac-
quisitions, the accumulation of cash pile in the balance sheet. Corporate performance
decreases.
This alternative story puts external governance to the fore: when corporate gov-
ernance is bad, the firm performs less well, and most executives are more junior than
the CEO. If this were true, however, the existing literature on “external” governance
would have had no trouble in finding a positive statistical relation between corporate
performance and any measure of governance quality. As it turns out however, existing
contribution have repeatedly failed to find a positive correlation between the share of
outsiders in the board and profitability (see Baghat and Black (2003) and also Hermalin
and Weisbach (2003) for a survey). Using corporate charter based measures of gover-
nance, Gompers, Ishii and Metrick (2003) do not find a consistent correlation between
investor friendly firm level institutions and operating performance. Thus, the available
evidence casts doubts on internal governance being a proxy of external governance in
our regressions.
To investigate the issue further, we look at the correlation between our measure
of internal governance and some measures of “external” governance that are usually
used in the literature. To do this, we regress our internal governance proxy on (1) the
Gompers-Ishii-Metrick index of governance (hereafter GIM, available from Andrew
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Metrick’s homepage), which takes large values for management-friendly corporate
charters, (2) the size of the board (the number of directors), (3) the share of direc-
tors who are currently employees of the firm and (4) the share of past employees of the
firm.
The results of these regressions, controlling for CEO and executive seniorities as
well as firm size are reported in table 5. As it turns out, our index is not correlated at all
with the charter based GIM index. Indices based on board composition have stronger
and more significant correlations, but in the direction opposite to what the “external
governance” story would predict ! Firms with larger board - which Yermack (1996)
views as inefficient - tend to have better internal governance. Firms with more past or
current employees on the board also have better internal governance. None of these re-
sults are consistent with internal governance being a proxy of external governance. One
plausible interpretation along the line of our “internal governance matters” hypothesis
is the following. The peculiarity of these board members is their intimate knowledge
of human capital and power struggles within the firm. Insiders or ex-insiders sitting
on the board have enough information about the competence of executives within the
firm to prevent the CEO from arbitrarily putting aligned executives at a majority of the
key-positions. By preventing the CEO from nominating new executives, they enforce
a high level of internal governance.
To confirm the above analysis, table 6 gathers new estimates of equation (1) in-
cluding external governance measures as further controls. In 5 out of 6 specifications,
external corporate governance is not significantly correlated with accounting perfor-
mance measures, whether we control for internal governance (reported results) or not
(unreported, but available from the authors upon request).
Table 9 in appendix re-runs the same regressions using market to book as the de-
pendent variables: as it turns out, board size and the GIM index are both negatively
and significantly correlated with market value of assets, in a way fully consistent with
Yermack (1996) and Gompers et al. (2003). The correlation however vanishes once we
include our internal governance index in the regression, however.
2.4 Information Asymmetry and Internal Governance
We end our investigation by asking when corporate governance is most useful. It is
likely that the need for good governance, in particular good internal governance, be
higher when the degree of asymmetric information between the CEO and the share-
holders is larger.
To test this, we estimate the following modified version of (1):
Yit = α+β.AIi× IGit−1 + γ.AIi +µ.IGit−1 + controlsit + εit (5)
where AIi is a measure of the information asymmetry surrounding the decisions that
the CEO has to make. We expect β to be negative if internal governance matters more
in asymmetric information environments (recall that IGit is larger when internal gov-
ernance is weaker).
Table 7 reports the regression results of such equation using 4 different proxies for
information asymmetry. In column 1, it is measured by the firm being in an industry
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whose average Q is above median in 1993. In column 2, we look at industries whose
cross sectional dispersion of ROA is higher than the median in 1993. Column 3 looks
at R&D intensive industry (again, in 1993) and column 4 looks at industries whose av-
erage stock return volatility is above median in 1993.9 We assume that these measures
of uncertainty also proxy for the amount of information asymmetry: everybody knows
what to do when uncertainty is low.
The results reported in table 7 provide the consistent view that internal governance
matters only when firms are operating in more volatile environment. For firms oper-
ating under low uncertainty, internal governance is not correlated with corporate per-
formance (µ is not significantly different from zero). All the effect is concentrated on
firms operating in uncertain environments.
3 A Model of Internal Governance.
We now study the normative implications of our empirical findings. As stated in the
introduction, a natural interpretation since at least Lipton and Lorsch (1992) is that
independent directors lack the information that subordinates have. The normative im-
plication of such a model is to provide more information to independent directors.
We show here that there is an alternative interpretation of our results. Top ex-
ecutives implement the CEO’s strategy. It is the fact of having to do this that gives
executives power over the CEO. When executives and the CEO disagree, the CEO has
to incorporate his executives’ beliefs into his strategy choice and orders, for if he does
not do it, executives are likely to lack enthusiasm and put in too little implementation
effort. Disagreement is good, in that it compels the CEO to “average” his own be-
liefs with those of his executives. Decision making is biased, at the cost of reduced
incentives. This section fleshes out this intuition.
The intuition
The main intuition of our model is as follows. Assume that the manager of a firm
receives a private signal on which project the firm should pursue. When the information
is opposite to his initial prior, the manager of a homogeneous organization under-reacts
to the signal. He does so more than in a diverse organization because he overvalues
the marginal value of his (aligned) workers effort or in other words overestimates the
opportunity cost of “disappointing” them. On the contrary, in an organization with
diverse executives, the manager has lower incentives to lie as he ignores the project
the executives believe in. Therefore, diversity of opinions inside the firm makes the
reaction to negative information more efficient.
On the other hand, having executives with diverse opinions does not come without
cost. Diverse organizations are more prone to disagreements among the management
team over the project to implement, leading to a lower level of expected effort (Van den
Steen (2004)).
9Volatility is computed at the firm level by taking the stock return volatility over 60 months before the
end of fiscal year 1993.
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This trade-off between reactivity to new information and incentives crucially de-
pends on the precision of the private information detained by the manager. When
information accurate enough, the value of reactivity for the shareholder is high and
therefore diversity tends to be the optimal organizational form because of the value of
”bottom-up governance”.
3.1 Timeline and assumptions
The organization
We model “internal governance” using as a building-block the theory of managerial
vision developped by Van den Steen (2004). A shareholder chooses the organizational
form of a firm composed of a manager and an executive. The shareholder is the owner
of the organization and has formal authority over the organizational design of the or-
ganization. The manager is the decision-maker: he has formal authority over which
project the organization should pursue. The executive is the performer: he receives an
order from the manager and implements it.
Project structure
The organization faces two projects, namely project A and B. There are two states of
the world (which we also call A and B). In state of the world i, project i is successful
for sure whereas project j is doomed to failure. The common ex-ante prior is that
both projects are equally likely. Once hired though, the manager and the executives
will form an opinion regarding what the true state of the world is. We assume that
these probabilities are drawn from {1−µ,µ} with probability { 12}, and µ ≥ 12 .
The success of a project gives a payoff R to the shareholders and γm (resp γe) to the
manager (resp. the executives) ; failure brings zero to the three agents.
The timeline
The timeline of the model is the following (and as represented in figure 1):
• At time 0, the shareholder chooses an organizational form: homogeneous or
diverse (internal governance). He also hires a manager and an executive.
• At time 1, the beliefs of the manager are drawn. They are either µ ≥ 12 with
probability 12 or 1− µ with probability 12 : µ can be interpreted as the scope for
potential disagreement in the industry.
– If the organization is homogeneous, the beliefs of the executives comes
from the same draw.
– If the organization is diverse, the beliefs of the executives are drawn inde-
pendently.
• At time 2, a signal σ ∈ {“A”,“B”} is privately observed by the manager who
updates his priors according to Baye’s law.
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• At time 3, the subordinate receives the order from the manager to do either
project A or B and he discovers the effort cost e ∼ U [0,1]. He then chooses
whether to perform the effort or shirk.
Informational Assumptions
1. We assume that the structure of the signal is common information. More pre-
cisely, everyone know the precision α of the signal, al pha being defined as:
P[σ = “A”|A] = P[σ = “B”|B] = α≥ 1
2
2. We assume that the signal σ is private information to the manager. We support
this assumption for two reasons. First, it seems natural to give a particular role to
the manager: we think it is safe to assume that he may have some technological
advantage in screening the states of the world. Second, assume that the signal
was also observed by the executive. Then, it would not be very difficult for the
shareholder to design a mechanism extracting the true value of the signal (see
e.g. Moore (1992)): communication would then no longer be an issue and our
governance mechanism would therefore be useless.
3. We assume that the beliefs of both manager and executive are not observable by
the shareholder, but the project undertaken by the manager is public informa-
tion. This is also a crucial assumption as relaxing it would allow the shareholder
to discover the nature of the signal for some parameters and would once again
minimize the role played by communication in our model.
3.2 Analysis of the equilibria
We begin this section by defining the equilibrium concept used to solve the model (see
Fudenberg and Tirole (1991) for details).
Definition 1 A perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the game is defined by an order func-
tion O: {σ,µ} 7→ {“A”,“B”} and a belief function b: {O({σ,µ}),µ′} 7→ R2 of the
executive, such that, conditional on the beliefs function of the executive, the order O
given by the manager is individually rational.
As a benchmark, consider the case where both the manager and the executive sub-
ordinate hold unbiased initial beliefs (µ = 1/2) about the state of the world. The signal
then dictates what the manager should order: there is no motive for the manager to
conceal information to his subordinate. The situation changes when beliefs are biased
for two reasons: first, the initial bias of the manager might be strong enough to prevent
him changing his mind about which the preferable project is ; second, in a homoge-
neous organization, the manager is certain about the executive’s opinion and therefore
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internalizes the effect of its order on the executive’s beliefs and therefore effort. How-
ever, because of his optimism, he tends to overweight the option value of preserving
the executive’s initial belief. This particular effect is at the core of the communication
advantage of diverse organization: in such organizations, the manager can only im-
perfectly take account of the participation constraint of the executive as he ignores his
exact belief. Moreover, orders of the managers have less of an impact on the execu-
tive’s beliefs, as he does not know if they are due to the manager’s initial priors or to
the intermediate signal.
We now turn to the determination of equilibria. For each type of organization and
each {µ,α} ∈ [ 12 ,1]2, we characterize the unique Bayesian equilibrium.
3.2.1 Equilibrium in the homogeneous organization
We begin by analyzing the case of a homogeneous organization, where the manager
and the executive share the same belief on the state of nature, and both know that their
beliefs are identical. The equilibrium is determined in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 In a homogeneous organization, and for each α∈ [ 12 ,1], there exist two
thresholds µ?(α)< µ??(α), such that the unique Bayesian equilibrium depends on the
relative value of the initial prior µ with respect to the thresholds:
1. When µ ∈ [ 12 ,µ?(α)], the equilibrium is fully revealing: the manager always
stick to the signal and the executive knows that the order reflects the true content
of the signal. We call this region the communication region.
2. When µ ∈ [µ?(α),µ??(α)], the manager adopts a mixed strategy that imperfectly
reveals the content of the signal. More precisely, if the manager is biased toward
action A, he will react to a signal “B” by ordering randomly action A or B.
Communication is thus “scrambled” in this region.
3. For µ ∈ [µ??(α),1], the manager does not react on a signal conflicting his opin-
ion: this is the no-communication region.
We can derive the intuitions from the different regions of equilibrium:
• If the initial prior is high enough (the manager and the executive are very biased
toward action A), the manager will never want to revise his opinion, even if he
faces a negative signal (S = “B”). Therefore the order is completely uninforma-
tive for the executive who stick to their initial belief.
• If the initial prior is close enough to 12 , the manager has “weak” preferences over
an action. Therefore, he is more likely to revise its opinion when confronted with
a conflicting signal. As the executive observes manager’s belief, he knows that it
is individually rational for him to be “sincere”. Thus, in that zone, the reactivity
to the signal is efficient and the order fully reveals to the employee the signal that
the manager received.
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• There is an intermediate zone: by playing one of the pure strategy mentioned
above, the manager would always want to deviate (when facing a conflicting sig-
nal, he does not want to tell the truth because he has too strong an opinion, but
he also does not want to fully lie because he has too weak an opinion). There-
fore, the only bayesian equilibrium is for him to randomly lie when facing a
conflicting signal.
Proof. See appendix E
To understand the nature of this equilibrium, it is important to see how the CEO’s
decision differs from what the shareholder would order if he had the CEO’s informa-
tion:
Proposition 3 at the neighborhood of µ = µ?, an unbiased decision maker in posses-
sion of the CEO’s information would strictly prefer to order B if the signal is B. In
other words, there is under-reaction to contrarian news in this equilibrium..
The fact that the CEO internalizes the impact of his order on managerial beliefs
and therefore effort is not inefficient per se (this effect should be part of the efficient
decision). The inefficiency stems from the fact that due to his initial bias, the CEO
overestimates the option value of not disappointing the manager. Consider the decision
of a µ−manager facing a contrarian signal B in the zone where there is reactivity. Then,
by ordering action B, the manager reveals that the signal is B, triggering a revision of
beliefs by the executive. More precisely, he is now convinced that the signal was “B”,
and therefore believes that the probability of the state being B is (1−µ)α(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) .
Therefore, the manager, by sticking to the equilibrium strategy, expects a payoff:
U1 =
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of success
γm
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)γe
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected effort of executives
This is smaller than the objective payoff:
U1ob j = α︸︷︷︸
true probability of success
γm
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) γe
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected effort of executives
Similarly, if the manager deviates from the equilibrium, ordering A although the
signal is “B”, he expects a pay-off:
U2 =
µ(1−α)
µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager’s belief that S=A
γm
 µαµα+(1−µ)(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
executive belief that S=A
γe

This is higher than the objective payoff of reacting to the signal:
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U2 = (1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
true that probability that S=A
γm
 µαµα+(1−µ)(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
executive belief that S=A
γe

It follows than when the manager becomes indifferent between these two strategies
(µ > µ?), he under-reacts to the signal compared to the efficient decision.
3.3 Diverse Organization
We now turn to the case of a diverse organization: the manager’s and the executive’s be-
liefs come from independent draws. In that case, the manager and the subordinate know
imperfectly each other’s belief: they only know it has been drawn from {µ,1−µ}.
The following proposition characterizes the unique Bayesian equilibrium according
to the value of µ:
Proposition 4 In a diverse organization, the unique Bayesian equilibrium is charac-
terized by:
1. full communication when µ ∈ [1−α,α],
2. no communication when µ ∈ [0,1−α]∪ [α,1].
The intuition for this result is the following. First, take the perspective of a manager
of belief µ who receives a signal B. If µ<α, his posterior is that project B is more likely
to be successful. The incentive effect of ordering B vs. A is neutral, since the executive
is as likely to be ex-ante pro-B as pro-A. Therefore, the manager orders B. How does
the executive interpret the signal ? Whether they are aligned or misaligned (i.e. µ˜ =
µ or 1−µ) the executive knows that the manager is not too extreme (max(µ,1−µ)<α).
Therefore, they know that the order directly reflects the signal and update accordingly.
When the manager becomes too “extreme”, executives know that the signal has no
influence on his decision, and therefore draw no inference from the order.
3.4 Comparison
The relative efficiency of the two organizational forms depends on two things: First, the
level of effort they implement. Second, the responsiveness of the firm’s strategy to new
informations: In both organizations, managers tend to under-react to news that come
against their initial prior, but this under-reaction is more pronounced in homogeneous
organizations. A manager facing managers that share is initial beliefs is more prone to
ignore information that recommends a change in strategy. The reason is that he over-
estimates the cost of the demotivating impact of a change of strategy on his troups. In
other words, the conflicting beliefs of executives create a virtuous internal governance
pressure: the CEO is more prone to adapt the firm’s strategy to new information. This
is what the following proposition implies:
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Proposition 5 Diverse organization is always weakly more reactive to information
than homogeneous organizations.
More precisely, there a is a whole range of initial beliefs ( µ ∈ [µ??,α]) for which
the manager is inefficiently unreactive to the signal in a homogeneous organization
contrary to a diverse organization:
µ?? < α
Proof. See annex G
This proposition suggests that when reactivity to new information is relatively im-
portant, the diverse organization might dominate the homogeneous one. To character-
ize for what range of parameters this actually happens, we compute the ex-ante orga-
nization values, from the shareholder point of view. We remind that a shareholder is
a priori neutral with regard to project’s choice. He therefore only trades off between
the two effects that we have already pinned down, namely reactivity vs. incentives. In
the computation of firm value, two terms arise: the probability, from the shareholder
ex-ante point of view, that the “good” action is undertaken by the manager ; the mean
expected effort exerted by the executives. The following lemma provides the detailed
value of both type of organization:
Lemma 6 In a homogeneous organization, the value of the firm can be written as:
V (µ,α)=

αγE R
2
(
µα
µα+(1−µ)(1−α) +
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸ if µ ∈
[
1
2
,µ?
]
γE R
2
(
µ
(α+ρ(µ)(1−α))2
(µα+(1−µ)(1−α))+ρ(µ)(µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α) +(1−ρ(µ))α
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)
)
if µ ∈ [µ?,µ??]
µγE R
2
if µ ∈ [µ??,1]
In a diverse organization, the firm’s value is given ex-ante by:
V (µ,α) =
γE R
2

α
(
µα
µα+(1−µ)(1−α) +
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)
)
if µ ∈
[
1
2
,α
]
1
2
if µ ∈ [α,1]
Proof. The proof is direct using the expression of executive’s effort determined in
the other proofs. One can view how firm values evolve with (α, µ) in figure 3 and 4.
We now are in position to compare both type of organization. This is the object of
theorem 7:
Theorem 7 1. for µ < µ?(α), firm values are similar in both type of organization
(both are fully reactive to information)
2. for µ?(α)< µ < α, a diverse organization is reactive and dominates a heteroge-
neous organization (which is not reactive).
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3. for α < µ < 1, a homogeneous organization dominates a diverse organization
(both are not reactive to contrarian information).
To understand the comparative statics implied by this proposition, consider the case
where we fix the scope-of-disagreement parameter µ to µ0 and let the signal’s precision,
α vary. First, when the signal is very precise, there is no failure of reactivity, because in
both types of organization, both the manager and the executive are convinced to make
up their mind according to the signal. At the same time, the incentives provided in
both firms are ex-ante equal: in a homogeneous firms, effort is good if signal confirms
the prior (ex-ante probability 12 ) but only “average” if signal contradicts the prior (ex-
ante probability 12 ) ; in a diverse organization, the executive is aligned with the order
(whatever the order) with probability 12 and misaligned also with probability 12 . Overall,
provision of effort is the same. This situation arises as long as reactivity is perfect in
both organization, that is as long as µ < µ?(α).
Now for some “mean” precision of the signal, reactivity becomes imperfect in ho-
mogeneous organization, whereas diversity allows to maintain a perfect reactivity to the
signal. The higher ex-ante probability of choosing the appropriate project outweighs
the cost in incentives implied by internal governance (as this organization always leaves
some scope for misalignment between manager and executive. This intermediate zone
corresponds to precision of the signal such that µ0 < α < µ?−1(µ0).
Finally when the signal becomes quite uninformative, the manager is not reactive
in both types of organizations. Therefore, the incentives issue becomes crucial. As a
homogeneous organization leaves no scope for disagreement with respect to the “good”
project to pursue, it will strictly dominates internal governance.
Proof. See Appendix H
The following corollary states two direct and intuitive consequences of the theorem:
Corollary 8 1. If there is no informative content in the signal (α = 12 ), the optimal
organizational design for the manager is to choose an homogeneous organiza-
tion: incentives being the crucial issue, internal governance is of no help
2. There are more frequent “corporate crisis” events (where the subordinate refuses
to obey to the order) in diverse than homogeneous organizations.
If the choice of organization was left to the CEO at time zero, he would be biased
towards choosing an aligned executive (compared to the efficient decision. The reason
is simple. The CEO, due to his own bias, always overestimates the value of an homoge-
neous organization (he overweights the probability of not adapting and underestimates
the cost of not adapting) and underestimates the value of a diverse organization (he un-
derestimates the value created by adapting to a contrarian signal). We can even make
a stronger statement about the cost of delegating organizational choice (i.e. hiring de-
cisions) fully to the CEO: the exist a range of parameters for which the CEO chooses
a homogeneous organization, when the optimal choice is diverse. To see this, consider
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the right neighborhood of µ? : By definition, µ? is the threshold where the CEO is in-
different between adapting to conflicting signals or not. The CEO’s ex-ante valuation
of organizations is not discontinuous in µ?, but the true value is. Since the CEO strictly
prefers the homogeneous organization on the left of µ?, he will also do so in a right
neighborhood of µ?, even though the optimal organization is the diverse one.
Proposition 9 1. The preferences of a CEO are biased towards homogeneous or-
ganizations
2. A CEO to whom organizational; choice is delegated makes the inefficient choice
of choosing homogeneity in a right neighborhood of µ?
A last proposition, in line with our empirical results deal with the relative volatility
of cash-flows in the two types of organization. In our model, the form that dominates
has the smallest cash-flow volatility:
Proposition 10 The coefficient of variation of the cash-flows of the organizational
form that dominates is lower than in the other form.
proof: The expected cash-flow (the value of the firm) is simply : V = pR, where
p is the ex-ante probability of success of the project that is undertaken. The variance
is therefore: [p(1− p)2 +(1− p)p2]R2 = p(1− p)R2. The coefficient of variation is
therefore
(
1−p
p
)1/2
, which varies inversely of the expected cash-flow value pV .
We view the insight of our model as the following: When there is uncertainty ex-
ante about which project is the best for the firm, there is a natural trade-off between
the positive ”evening-out” effect of diversity of opinions in the organization (extreme
views are mitigated) and the ”motivation effect” of aligned opinions (such as described
by Van den Steen [2004]). Therefore, the stronger the dispersion of beliefs is, the more
valuable it is to have internal governance (i.e. diversity) to neutralize the more extreme
beliefs a CEO might embrace. However, such a simple intuition is incomplete, and in
particular insufficient to make comparative statics statements. Indeed, industries with
strong belief dispersion might also be those where the CEO plays a more crucial role,
for example by having more private information about the firm’s optimal strategy. If
the CEO has more input in the firm’s success, one might want to give him more power,
not less. Our model shows why this last intuition is not right: The more information
the CEO has, the more valuable it actually is to rely on ”internal governance”. The
reason is that when the bias of the CEO and his employees are aligned, the reactivity
of the CEO to new signals becomes inefficiently lower. In the presence of disagreeing
executives, the CEO becomes more prone to change the course of the firm’s strategy,
which tends to make the diverse organization more efficient.
4 Conclusion
TO BE WRITTEN
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A Tables
Table 1: Accounting Performance and Internal Governance
Return on Assets Return on Equity
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Internal governance -6.2∗∗∗ -5.1∗∗∗ -3.0∗∗∗ -11.7∗∗∗ -7.3∗∗∗ -6.6∗∗∗
(delayed by 1 year) (1.0) (0.9) (0.8) (1.6) (1.6) (1.5)
Mean executive seniority - 0.2∗∗∗ 0.1∗∗ - 0.2∗ 0.1
in the firm (×10 y.) (0.1) (0.0) (0.1) (0.1)
CEO tenure as CEO - 1.3∗∗∗ 0.6∗∗∗ - 1.6∗∗∗ 1.0∗∗
(×10 y.) (0.3) (0.2) (0.4) (0.4)
Log(assets) - 1.1∗∗∗ 0.8∗∗∗ - 2.4∗∗∗ 2.2∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.1) (0.3) (0.3)
Log(Firm Age+1) - -0.4 0.1 - 0.4 1.3∗∗∗
(0.3) (0.2) (0.5) (0.5)
Sales Growth - 7.9∗∗∗ 8.7∗∗∗ - 9.7∗∗∗ 10.0∗∗∗
(0.6) (0.5) (1.2) (1.2)
Initial profitability - 0.4∗∗∗ - - 0.2∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.0)
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
48 Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 9,721 9,563 9,281 9,664 9,496 9,106
Source: Huber-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for correlation of all observations of a given
firm. “Internal Governance” is the share of EXECUCOMP executives who joined the company
after the CEO was appointed. Corporate performance of measured through Return on Assets
(first three columns) and through Return on Equity (last three columns). All regressions use
log(book assets), year dummies and the 48 Fama French industry dummies. In columns 2 and 5,
we add the CEO’s tenure as CEO, the executives’ average tenure in the firm, log of firm age (as
proxied by date of entry in COMPUSTAT) and sales growth as further controls. Columns 3 and
6 also add the firm’s profitability computed in its first year of presence in COMPUSTAT after
1991, as a limited attempt to control for firm level unobserved heterogeneity.
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Table 2: Accounting Performance and Internal Governance - Robustness
ROA ROE
1995 -5.6∗∗∗ -5.1
(2.1) (4.8)
1996 -4.6∗∗ -7.8∗∗
(2.0) (3.5)
1997 -6.1∗∗∗ -9.7∗∗∗
(1.8) (3.7)
1998 -7.7∗∗∗ -7.9∗∗
(1.8) (4.0)
1999 -5.6∗∗∗ -3.3
(1.9) (3.7)
2000 -4.8∗∗∗ -7.4∗
(1.8) (4.0)
2001 -6.2∗∗∗ -7.9∗∗
(1.8) (3.6)
2002 -3.6∗∗ -8.8∗∗
(1.5) (4.5)
Fama-Mac Beth -5.5∗∗∗ -7.2∗∗∗
(0.4) (0.7)
Source: OLS estimates. Regressions or corporate performance on internal governance and con-
trols are run each year separately. Internal governance is measured as the share of EXECUCOMP
executives who joined the company after the CEO was appointed. The coefficients on internal
governance and their standard error are reported. Each column correponds to the choice of one
corporate performance measure (ROA or ROE). Corporate performance is then regressed on
one-year-lagged internal governance, controlling for CEO and executive seniority, log(assets),
log(firm age), sales growth and 48 industry-dummies. The specification is identical to table 1,
columns 2 and 5. The bottom row indicates the Fama-Mac Beth estimate.
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Table 3: Accounting Performance and Internal Governance - Granger
Causality
Internal ROA Internal ROA
Governance Governance
Internal governance 0.87∗∗∗ -0.01∗∗∗ 0.81∗∗∗ -0.02∗∗∗
(lagged 1 yr) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00)
ROA -0.02∗ 0.77∗∗∗ -0.03∗ 0.75∗∗∗
(lagged 1 yr) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CEO tenure as CEO - - 2.95∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗
(× 10 yrs) (0.26) (0.09)
Executives’ Seniority - - -0.38∗∗∗ 0.05∗∗∗
in the firm (× 10 yrs) (0.04) (0.02)
Log(Assets) - - -0.30∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.52)
Log(1+Firm Age) - - -1.03∗∗∗ 0.48∗∗∗
(0.20) (0.10)
Sales Growth - - 1.78∗∗∗ 7.32∗∗∗
(0.49) (0.40)
48 industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,171 9,626 9,033 9,486
Source: Hubert-White-Sandwhich estimates, allowing for residuals correlated across observa-
tion of each firm. In the first panel, column 1 reports the estimate of a regression of internal
governance on past internal governance and past corporate performance. Column 2, we report
the result of a regression of corporate performance on past internal governance and past cor-
porate performance. Both regressions control for industry and year fixed effects. The second
panel reports the same regression results, with additional firm level controls, as reported in the
table. Internal governance is measured as the share of EXECUCOMP executives who joined the
company after the CEO was appointed. Corporate performance is measured through Return on
Assets. Standard errors are between parentheses.
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Table 4: Agency Costs of Weak Internal Governance
CEO Cash / CEO Total
Turnover M&A Assets Compensation
Internal Governance -5.4∗∗∗ 6.3∗∗ 6.1∗∗∗ 0.29∗∗∗
(1.6) (3.1) (1.6) (0.09)
CEO tenure as CEO 1.8∗∗∗ 0.5 -0.0 -0.09∗∗∗
(× 10 yrs) (0.5) (1.0) (0.0) (0.03)
Executive mean sen. -0.1 -0.5∗∗ -0.0 -0.02∗∗∗
in the firm (× 10 yrs) (0.1) (0.2) (0.1) (0.01)
ROA -0.1∗∗∗ 0.3∗∗∗ -4.2 0.36∗∗
(delayed by 1 yr) (0.0) (0.1) (3.4) (0.18)
M/B - 0.7 - -
(delayed by 1 yr) (0.5)
log(assets) 0.7∗∗∗ 1.6∗∗∗ -3.1∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗
(0.2) (0.4) (0.2) (0.01)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
48 Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,219 8,626 9,692 9,580
Source: OLS estimates, allowing for heteroskdastic residuals. Each column correposnds to the
choice of one executive bonding variable and one corporate performance measure. Corporate
performance is then regressed on executive bonding, controlling for log(assets), 48 industry-
dummies, CEO seniority, a dummy equal o one when the CEO has been hired from outside the
firm and a dummy equal to one when the firm belongs to the S&P500. The bottom rows indicate
Fama-Mac Beth estimates. Measure #1 is the share of EXECUCOMP executives who joined the
company after the CEO was appointed. Measure #2 is the share of EXECUCOMP executives
who joinde the company less than 1 year after the CEO was appointed. Corporate performance
of measured through Return on Assets, Return on Equity and Market to Book ratio.
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Table 5: Are Internal and External Governance Related ?
Internal Governance
(1) (2) (3) (4)
GIM Governance index 0.2 - - 0.0
(0.2) (0.2)
Board size - -0.3 - -0.5∗∗
(0.2) (0.2)
Frac directors - - -14.7∗∗∗ -11.2∗∗
who are current employees (4.2) (4.9)
Frac indep. directors - - -11.5∗∗ -9.5
who are former employees (5.2) (5.9)
CEO/Firm controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
48 industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 6,199 4,252 4,252 3,178
Source: OLS estimates, allowing for heteroskdastic residuals. Internal governance (see table
1) is regressed on various corporate governance indicators, controlling for log(assets), log(firm
age), sales growth, 48 industry-dummies, year fixed effects, CEO tenure and executive seniority.
Columns 1 to 4 add various corporate governance controls. Column 1 uses the corporate charter
based corporate governance index from Gompers,Ishii and Metrick (2003). Column 2 uses the
number of directors on the board as a measure of board effectiveness. Columns 3 uses two
classical measures of board dependence to the CEO: the share of currently employed directors
and the share of past employees. Column 4 uses all four measures simultaneously.
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Table 6: Internal Versus External Governance
Return on Assets Return on Equity
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
Internal governance -2.9∗∗∗ -3.5∗∗∗ -3.5∗∗∗ -6.2∗∗∗ -5.1∗∗ -5.2∗∗
(delayed by 1 year) (1.0) (1.2) (1.2) (1.9) (2.3) (2.4)
GIM governance index -0.0 - - 0.1 - -
(0.1) (0.1)
Board size (# directors) - -0.0 - - 0.2 -
(0.1) (0.2)
% Directors currently - - 2.4 - - 1.2
employed (1.7) (3.6)
% Directors previously - - -1.7 - - 2.5
employed (2.5) (5.2)
Firm/CEO controls yes yes yes yes yes yes
Year effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
48 Industry effects yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,515 3,753 3,753 5,386 3,697 3,697
Source: Huber-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for correlation of all observations of a given
firm. The measure of internal governance is the share of EXECUCOMP executives who joined
the company after the CEO was appointed. Corporate performance is measured through Return
on Assets (first three columns) and through Return on Equity (last three columns). All regres-
sions use as controls: CEO and executive seniorities, sales growth, log(book assets), log(Firm
age), year dummies and the 48 Fama French industry dummies. Columns 1 and 4 use the corpo-
rate charter based corporate governance index from Gompers,Ishii and Metrick (2003). Columns
2 and 5 use the number of directors on the board as a measure of board effectiveness. Columns
3 and 6 use two classical measures of board dependence to the CEO: the share of currently
employed directors and the share of past employees. The limited availability of corporate gover-
nance data is responsible for the drop in observation number.
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Table 7: Internal Governance, Firm Profitability and Uncertainty
ROA
Uncertainty measure (1) (2) (3) (4)
Internal governance -2.0 -2.9∗∗∗ -2.6∗∗ -2.6∗∗
(Lagged one year) (1.6) (1.1) (1.1) (1.3)
Internal governance (-1) × -5.5∗∗∗ - - -
High Ind. 1992 Q (1.7)
Internal governance (-1) × - -4.5∗∗∗ - -
High Ind. 1992 ROA Sd (1.7)
Internal governance (-1) × - - -5.2∗∗∗ -
High Ind. 1992 R&D/sales (1.8)
Internal governance (-1) × - - - -3.8∗∗
High Ind. 1992 Stock Ret. Volat. (1.7)
Firm/CEO controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
48 Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 9,563 9,563 9,089 9,563
Source: Hubert-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for heteroskdastic residuals: residuals may
be correlated across observations of each firm. ROA is the dependent variable in all regressions
and is regressed on our measure of internal governance, a measure of industry level uncertainty
and the interaction of both. Controls are industry and year fixed effects, CEO tenure, executive
seniority, firm log(assets), log(Firm age) and sales growth. Each column corresponds to the
choice of one uncertainty measure. Column 1 uses a dummy equal to 1 if the industry median
q in 1992 is above median. In column 2, the dummy is equal to 1 if the industry s.d. of ROA
in 1992 is above median. In column 3, it is equal to 1 if the industry median R&D / sales ratio
is above median. In column 4, it is equal to 1 if the industry’s average stock return volatility in
1993 is above median; stock return volatility is computed in the 60 months to the end of fiscal
1993. Standard errors are between parentheses.
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B Additional Tables
Table 8: Market Value of Assets and Internal Governance
Tobin’s Q
(1) (2) (3)
Internal governance 0.05 -0.29∗∗∗ -0.31∗∗∗
(delayed by 1 year) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10)
Mean executive seniority 0.02∗∗ 0.03∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗
in the firm (×10 y.) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CEO tenure as CEO 0.62 0.06 0.06∗
(×10 y.) (0.42) (0.04) (0.03)
Log(assets) - -0.05∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.02) (0.02)
Log(Firm Age+1) - -0.14∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.04) (0.04)
Sales Growth - 0.96∗∗∗ 0.72∗∗∗
(0.07) (0.07)
Q0 - - 0.42∗∗∗
(0.04)
Observations 8,983 8,839 7,953
Source: Huber-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for correlation of all observations of a given
firm. The measure of internal governance is the share of EXECUCOMP executives who joined
the company after the CEO was appointed. Corporate performance is measured through market
to book value assets (see appendix for the definition) . Controls are log(book assets), log(firm
age), log(sales growth), CEO and executives’ seniorities. All regression also include year dum-
mies and the 48 Fama French industry dummies. Columns 1 to 3 report estimates of the regres-
sions of market to book on internal governance using various controls.
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Table 9: Market Value of Assets: External vs Internal Governance
GIM Governance Board Board
Index Size Composition
Internal governance - -0.37∗∗∗ - -0.46∗∗∗ - -0.44∗∗∗
(delayed by 1 year) (0.15) (0.18) (0.18)
GIM governance index -0.02∗∗ -0.01 - - - -
(0.01) (0.01)
Board Size - - -0.25∗∗ -0.26∗ - -
log(# board directors) (0.11) (0.14)
Frac. current employees - - - - 0.26 0.49
on the board (0.24) (0.31)
Frac. past employees - - - - -0.07 -0.08
on the board (0.29) (0.39)
Observations 9,115 5,137 5,936 3,449 5,936 3,449
Source: Huber-White-Sandwich estimates, allowing for correlation of all observations of a given
firm. The measure of internal governance is the share of EXECUCOMP executives who joined
the company after the CEO was appointed. Corporate performance is measured through market
to book value assets (see appendix for the definition) . Controls are log(book assets), log(firm
age), log(sales growth), CEO and executives’ seniorities. All regression also include year dum-
mies and the 48 Fama French industry dummies. Columns 1,3 and 5 report estimates of the
regressions of market to book on various external governance measures (as defined in table 5)
using these controls. Columns 2,4 and 6 also add our “internal” corporate governance measure.
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C Variable Definitions
C.1 From ExecuComp
Executive seniority is computed as the tenure of the executive within the firm in years.
It is computed as the difference between the current fiscal year (YEAR) and the year
in which the executive joined the company (JOINED C).
CEO seniority is the number of year spent as CEO of the firm. It is computed as
the difference between the current fiscal year (YEAR) and the year in which the CEO
was appointed as CEO (BECAME CE).
The share of related executives is the fraction of executives whose seniority within
the firm is lower than the CEO’s tenure as CEO.
CEO compensation is the CEO’s “total compensation including option grants”
(TDC1).
C.2 From Compustat
Return on Assets (ROA) is Operating Income Before Depreciation (item 13) minus
Depreciation and Amortization (item 14) over Total Assets (item 6).
Return on Equity (ROE) is Net Income (item 172) over Common Equity (item
60)
Assets if Total Assets (item 6)
Market to Book is the ratio of market to book value of assets (item 6). The market
value is computed as Total Assets (item 6) plus the number of common shares outstand-
ing (item 25) times share price at the end of the fiscal year (item 199) minus Common
Equity (item 60) minus Deferred Taxes (item 74).
Cash over Assets is the ratio of cash holdings in the balance sheet (item 1) over
total assets (item 6)
The M&A dummy is computed using the footnotes and is equal to one as soon as
one significant acquisition has been undertaken. More formally, it is equal to 1 if “sales
growth reflect a merger or acquisition” (item aftnt1 equals “AA”, “AS”, “FA”, “FB” or
“FC”), if “sales growth reflect a significant merger or acquisition whereby the effects
on the prior year’s sales constitute 50% or more of the reported sales for that year”
(aftnt1 equals “AB”).
Industry dummies are computed using the four digit SIC codes as reported in
COMPUSTAT, and then aggregating them into the 48 Fama and French industries. The
correspondance table was taken from Kenneth French’s web site.
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D Figures
Figure 1: Timeline of the model
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Figure 2: (α,µ) region of equilibria
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Figure 3: Value of homogeneous vs. diverse organizations for µ ∈ [0.5,1] and α=0.75.
Internally governed firm is in blue ; homogeneous organization is in green
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Figure 4: Value of homogeneous vs. diverse organizations for α ∈ [0.5,1] and µ=0.75.
Internally governed firm is in blue ; homogeneous organization is in green
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E Proof of Proposition 2
To prove this proposition, we consider successively the potential forms that the equilibrium can take and show they exist on
the intervals stated by the proposition.
Full communication equilibrium
We look for a revealing equilibrium. Consider thus an order function of the manager given by the following:
• if σ = “A”, the manager orders action A,
• if σ = “B”, the manager orders action B.
And a belief function b of the executive defined by:
• if the manager orders A, then the executive believes with probability one that the signal is “A”
• if the manager orders B, then the executive believes with probability one that the signal is “B”
We determine the condition under which this is indeed an equilibrium (individually rational constraint). Assume that
the manager has drawn opinion µ ≥ 12 , that we are at equilibrium and signal is “B”10. Then, by ordering action B, the
manager reveals that the signal is B, triggering a revision of beliefs by the executive. More precisely, he is now convinced
that the signal was “B”, and therefore believes that the probability of the state being B is (1−µ)α(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) .
Therefore, the manager, by sticking to the equilibrium strategy, obtains a payoff:
U1 =
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
probability of success
γ
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected effort of executives
Similarly, if the manager deviates from the equilibrium, ordering A although the signal is “B”, he then receives expected
pay-off:
U2 =
µ(1−α)
µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α︸ ︷︷ ︸
manager’s belief that S=A
γ
 µαµα+(1−µ)(1−α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
executive belief that S=A
γ

To interpret this equation, note that there is on the left a cost from deviating due to a smaller expected probability of
success but also (on the right) a gain coming from the higher incentives of the manager who gets fooled in believing S = A.
Now the manager will not deviate as long as:
U1 >U2 ⇔ (1−µ)
2 α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) >
µ2(1−α)
µα+(1−µ)(1−α) ⇔ ψ(µ)> 0
Where:
ψ(µ) = (2α−1)µ3 +2α(1−2α)µ2 +α(4α−3)µ+α(1−α)
This determines a threshold µ?(α) such that the equilibrium is sustainable as long as µ≤ µ?(α) 11
10it is immediate to check that, as long as µ > 12 , the manager has no incentive to deviate from equilibrium
11One can show that:
∀α,∃µ?(α) ∈ [0,1] such that: ∀µ < µ?(α), ψ(µ)> 0
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No Communication Equilibrium
We look for an equilibrium with no communication. Therefore consider the following order and belief functions, for µ > 12 :{
O(σ,µ) = A
b(O(σ,µ),µ′) = µ′
The manager always stick to its prior, and the executive draw no inference from the manager’s order. Off-equilibrium,
when the manager orders B although he is known to have a bias µ > 12 , we’ll assume that it is common belief that the
executives believes that signal “B” was received.
We determine the conditions under which this forms an equilibrium. Consider the case when the signal is B and the
manager has drawn a belief µ > 12 . The expected payoff of a manager playing the equilibrium and ordering A in spite of the
signal is given by the product:
U1 =
µ(1−α)
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected pay-off for manager if effort is exerted
(µγ)︸︷︷︸
expected effort of executives
Consider now a deviation from the equilibrium by the manager who orders action B ; his expected pay-off becomes:
U2 =
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) γ︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected pay-off for manager if effort is exerted
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) γ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected effort of executives
Therefore, the no-communication equilibrium is sustainable if and only if:
U1 >U2 ⇔ φ(µ)≥ 0⇔ µ≥ µ??(α)
Where µ??(α) is defined by:
φ(µ) = (1−α)(1−2α)µ3 −α2µ2 +2αµ−α, andφ(µ??) = 0
12
To see why µ? < µ??, consider the following:
ψ(µ??)
((1−µ??)α+µ??(1−α))(µ??α+(1−µ??)(1−α)) =
(1−µ??)2 α
(1−µ??)α+µ??(1−α) −
(µ??)2 (1−α)
µ??α+(1−µ??)(1−α)
=
(
(µ??)2 (1−α)
)(
1− 1)
µ??α+(1−µ??)(1−α)
)
< 0
And because ψ is decreasing on [0,1], this proves that: µ?? > µ?.
Imperfect communication equilibrium
We look for an equilibrium where the manager imperfectly reacts to a conflicting signal. Therefore consider the following
order and beliefs functions for a µ≥ 12 :
• when signal is “A”, the manager orders action A ; when signal is “B”, the manager orders A with probability ρ and
B with probability (1-ρ)
12We have: φ( 12 ) = 1−3α4 < 0, φ(1) = (1−α)2 > 0 and one can show that φ is increasing on [0,1] when α < 34 or inverse
U-Shaped on [0,1] when 1 > α > 34 . Therefore, in both cases, that means there is a unique µ
?? ∈ [ 12 ,1] such that φ(µ??) = 0.
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• when executive is ordered to do A, he revises his belief according to Baye’s Law and the order function of the
manager, and therefore believes that13
P(A|ordre = A) = µ α+ρ(1−α)
(µα+(1−µ)(1−α))+ρ(µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α)
We look now for this mixed-communication equilibrium to be sustainable. When the signal is “B” and initial beliefs
are µ≥ 12 , the expected pay-off from the equilibrium strategy is given by:
U = ρ
(
µ(1−α)
µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α
)(
µ
α+ρ(1−α)
(µα+(1−µ)(1−α))+ρ(µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α) γE
)
γM +(1−ρ)
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+(1−α)µ
)2
γMγE
For this to be an equilibrium, it must be the case that the expected payoff when ordering A is equal to the expected
payoff when ordering B: otherwise, the manager has always an incentive to play another mixed strategy ρ′ > ρ for instance
is the payoff of ordering A is higher than the payoff of ordering B. Therefore, the mixed equilibrium is an equilibrium if and
only if: (
µ(1−α)
µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α
)(
µ
α+ρ(1−α)
(µα+(1−µ)(1−α))+ρ(µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α)
)
=
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+(1−α)µ
)
Call
χ(ρ) =
(
µ(1−α)
µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α
)(
µ
α+ρ(1−α)
(µα+(1−µ)(1−α))+ρ(µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α)
)
It is easily seen that ∂χ′∂ρ < 0 so that χ is strictly decreasing on [0,1], from µ2(1−α) αµα+(1−µ)(1−α) = χ(0) to µ2(1−α) =
χ(1).
Noticing that χ(0) = µ2(1−α) αµα+(1−µ)(1−α) ⇔ µ = µ? and χ(1) = µ2(1−α)⇔ µ = mu??, we can also prove that for
each µ ∈ [ 12 ,1], there is a unique ρ(µ) ∈ [µ?,µ??], such that:
χ(ρ(µ)) =
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+(1−α)µ
)
F Proof of proposition 4
We first look for a revealing equilibrium. Consider therefore the following order and beliefs function :
• a manager always order as the signal says
• an executive always interprets the order as the signal
An executive therefore always revise its prior according to the order. For instance, by ordering action A, a µ-manager
with µ ∈ {1− µ¯, µ¯} can expect the following mean effort from executives (according to whether the executive is aligned or
mis-aligned):
E(order = A) = γ
2
(
µα
µα+(1−µ)(1−α) +
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)
)
13Indeed, we can compute the following probabilities:
P(ordre = A) = P(signal = “A”)+ρP(signal = “B”) = (µα+(1−µ)(1−α))+ρ(µ(1−α)+(1−µ)α)
P(ordre = A|A) = α+ρ(1−α)
Finally the result comes from Baye’s Law: P(A|ordre = A) = P(A)P(ordre=A|A)P(ordre=A)
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Similarly, in this “truthful” zone, it is easy to compute the expected effort from an order B
E(order = B) = γ
2
(
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α) +
µα
µα+(1−µ)(1−α)
)
= E(order = A) = E
Therefore, this truthful equilibrium is sustainable as long as the manager is willing to stick with signal “B”, that is:

µα
µα+(1−µ)(1−α)E >
(1−µ)(1−α)
µα+(1−µ)(1−α)E
(1−µ)α
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)E >
µ(1−α)
(1−µ)α+µ(1−α)E
This is equivalent to:
α > µ > 1−α
The proof that the no-communication equilibrium exists for µ < 1−al pha and µ > al pha goes exactly along the same
lines.
How come then that there is no longer scope for mixed equilibrium ? Because the manager ignores the true belief
of his executive, there is no incentives gain to deviation from equilibrium (the manager has always with probability 12 a
mis-aligned executive, whatever the order). Therefore, the deviation decision depends only on the manager’s own belief: as
long as his opinion is less “extreme” than the signal’s precision α, the manager believes the signal more than its opinion,
and therefore chooses to “go for the signal”. When his beliefs are more polarized than the precision of the signal, then, no
matter what the signal says, he will believe the right action is the one he initially believes in.
G Proof of proposition 5
The demonstration of this result is easy. Simply look at the following equation:
φ(α)
((1−µ)α+µ(1−α))2 =
α
2
− 1
4
≥ 0
φ increasing on [0,1] proves that : µ?? < α
H Proof of Theorem 7
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